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Abstract 
The insider-outsider theory has been commonly used to explain the hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment. However, there is no empirical evidence about the validity of insiders’ power on 
explaining the persistence of unemployment. This paper, using panel unit root tests that allow for 
the presence of covariates, addresses this gap and examines whether the insider-outsider theory, 
by means of various labour market proxies, can explain the hysteresis hypothesis for the OECD 
countries over 1960-2013. Our results show that although unemployment rate exhibits a 
pronounced hysteretic behaviour in OECD countries, this behaviour is reversed once we consider 
the insider-outsider proxies as covariates. This validates the role of insiders’ power as a key 
source of unemployment hysteresis.  
 
Keywords: Insider-outsider theory, Hysteresis, Unemployment, Panel unit root tests 
JEL Classification: C23, E24, J51, J64 
 
 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
 
An extensive strand of the literature tests the hysteresis in unemployment, a hypothesis which 
implies that any deviations of unemployment from its natural rate will be permanent, as 
suggested by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987). The empirical literature, however, provides 
mixed evidence. Whilst some studies have documented evidence of hysteresis, e.g. Mitchell 
(1993) and Bakas and Papapetrou (2014), others, such as Jaeger and Parkinson (1994), Arestis 
and Mariscal (1999) and Camarero and Tamarit (2004), provide evidence against. Noticeably, 
these studies examine the hysteresis hypothesis using alternative unit root testing techniques 
and/or different samples and pay no attention to investigate the sources of this phenomenon, 
which is important in addressing the persistence of unemployment. 
The insider-outsider theory has long been used to explain hysteresis in unemployment (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988). According to this theory, people who remain employed, insiders, are able to 
secure wage increases for themselves and prevent the unemployed, outsiders, from competing 
wages down (Blanchard and Summers, 1987 and Song and Wu, 1998). Insiders’ power reflects 
labour market rigidities and turnover costs which may affect the unemployment persistence 
level. Despite the widespread use of the insider-outsider theory as the key source of 
unemployment hysteresis, little is known about its validity empirically, and this is where our 
main contribution lies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that 
addresses this gap and evaluates whether the insider-outsider theory, proxied by the measures of 
trade union density (Union), coordination of wage-setting (Coord) and level of wage-bargaining 
(Wbl), can explain the persistence of unemployment rate in a sample of OECD countries over the 
period 1960-2013.  
Theoretically, if labour market institutions turn to be more rigid, wages will start to increase. If 
this push in wages is not compatible with productivity, employment will tend to fall until the 
point that the higher unemployment in the economy will lead to a downward pressure on the 
wages that will offset the initial effect of the higher labour market rigidity. Thus, this mechanism 
can explain the impact of institutional rigidity on the natural rate of unemployment (Saint-Paul, 
2004). However, most OECD countries have experienced changes in labour market rigidities 
over the last decades. For example, many European countries have faced a sharp increase in 
3 
unemployment benefits after the 1960s, while the employment protection legislation index has 
increased for most of the countries over this period (Nickell, 2003). Furthermore, there is 
significant heterogeneity of labour market rigidities across the OECD countries (Saint-Paul, 
2004). Therefore, a series of studies have explored the relation between rigidities in labour 
market institutions and the rate of unemployment, and find that institutional rigidities play a vital 
role on explaining unemployment patterns and persistence (see for example Belot and Van Ours, 
2001, 2004 and Nickell, 2003). Finally, an important dimension of this environment is the power 
of the insiders which can determine labour market rigidities in the economy (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988). This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by analysing the nexus 
between insiders’ power, as a proxy of labour market rigidities, and unemployment persistence. 
Our empirical framework extends the panel unit root tests to allow for the presence of covariates 
in the testing equation of the hysteresis hypothesis for unemployment. By doing so, we take into 
account the information that is contained in the insider-outsider covariates, and thus conduct a 
direct test for the insider-outsider theory. Our results show, first, that using conventional panel 
unit root tests we find evidence of hysteresis in unemployment for the OECD countries. 
However, this result is completely reversed, and the unit root in unemployment rate is strongly 
rejected, once we employ the panel unit root tests allowing for the insider-outsider covariates. 
This supports the insider-outsider theory as a key source of the hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides the 
empirical methodology, while Section 4 presents our empirical results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
We use annual data from 1960 to 2013 for a panel of 17 OECD countries.1 This is the longest 
                                                          
1 The 17 OECD countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
4 
period for which the data for the labour market measures; trade union density, coordination of 
wage-setting and the level of wage-bargaining, are available.2 The source of unemployment rate 
(Un. Rate) and trade union density (Union) is the OECD labour force statistics whilst the source 
of the coordination of wage-setting (Coord) and the level of wage-bargaining (Wbl) is the 
ICTWSS Database Version 5.1.3 In addition, we have created the variable Power that consists 
the first principal component of the three labour market institution covariates (Union, Coord and 
Wbl). This aggregate measure encapsulates the insiders’ power of the three proxies.  
Trade union density is the trade union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners in 
employment. Trade union activity, which only represents the insiders’ interests, is considered as 
the most obvious source of insiders’ power (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988, Layard and Bean, 1989 
and Emmenegger, 2009). Moreover, we use two proxies of wage-bargaining level. The 
coordination of wage-setting is a discrete measure, ranging from 5 to 1, reflecting the degree of 
coordination from economy-wide bargaining to fragmented bargaining, confined largely to firm-
level. In addition, the level of wage-bargaining is a discrete measure that represents the 
predominant level at which wage bargaining takes place, ranging from 5 (national or central 
level) to 1 (local or company bargaining level), see van Ours, 2015. The high wage-bargaining 
power of insiders increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment via boosting labour market 
rigidities (Saint-Paul, 2004). Additionally, bargaining power is positively associated with 
turnover costs thereby it strengthens the position of insiders relative to outsiders, which enhances 
the wage pressure and unemployment rate (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 and Holmlund, 2014). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the unemployment rate for the 17 OECD countries against the 
OECD average for the period 1960-2013. The figure shows the substantial heterogeneity of 
OECD labour markets. Saint-Paul (2004) illustrates that the observed divergence in 
unemployment rates across Europe is a real difference in labor markets rather than a statistical 
artifact since this divergence cannot be explained by obvious measurement issues such as 
different definitions of unemployment across countries.  
                                                          
2  Minimum wages, labour turnover cost and employment protection legislation are other potential 
measures of the insider-outsider theory, however, the data for these factors are limited. 
3 We focus on these three proxies since the covariate panel unit root test of Pesaran et al. (2013) is 
available only for a maximum of three covariates. 
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate for the 17 OECD Countries against the OECD Average 
 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the unemployment rate and the covariates for our panel. 
A high variation in all variables is evident, for example trade union density (Union) range from 
7% to 84%. Furthermore, the average of both Coord and Wbl indicates that the wage-bargaining 
level, and thus the insiders’ power, is relatively high in our sample.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Un. Rate 5.458 3.468 0.002 17.147 Union 41.041 18.904 7.548 83.863 Coord 3.314 1.412 1.000 5.000 Wbl 3.022 1.349 1.000 5.000 Power 0.000 1.449 -2.728 2.778 Note: Descriptive statistics for the OECD sample, based on N = 17 and T = 54 (TxN = 918 Obs).   
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the covariates and the unemployment rate. 
The high correlation between Coord and Wbl is anticipated since both covariates reflect the 
wage-bargaining level. The positive correlation between Union and wage-bargaining level 
proxies (Coord and Wbl) indicates that all three covariates operate in an analogous manner, i.e., 
they reflect the power of insiders relative to outsiders.   Table 2: Correlation Coefficients between Covariates 
 Union Coord Wbl Union 1 
  Coord 0.473 1 
 Wbl 0.570 0.736 1 Note: The numbers refer to the Polyserial or Polychoric correlation coefficient depending on the type of the variables. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
 
To test for the hysteresis hypothesis (i.e., the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root) in the 
dynamics of the unemployment rate in our sample, we rely on panel augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests. Specifically, we use the MW test of Maddala and Wu (1999), the CH test 
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of Choi (2001), the IPS test of Im et al. (2003) and the CIPS test of Pesaran (2007), which 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence across the countries. 
In the case where the null hypothesis of hysteresis in unemployment is not rejected, we proceed 
and explore the insider-outsider theory as source of the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment, 
by employing panel unit root tests that allow for the presence of various labour market proxies as 
covariates in the panel regression. To do so, we use two panel unit root tests proposed by Pesaran 
et al. (2013), the CIPSM and CSBM tests, which incorporate additional covariates in the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller panel regression and account for a multifactor error structure. 
Therefore, these tests can exploit the information contained in a number of additional covariates 
(the labour market proxies) that are assumed to share the common factors with the 
unemployment rate. Following Pesaran et al. (2013), we augment the ADF panel regression with 
the cross-section averages of the lagged levels and first-differences of the unemployment rate 
and the additional covariates. In particular, we employ the following ADF panel regression: 
Δ𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑𝑗𝑗=1𝑝𝑝 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗Δ𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈�𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=0 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗Δ𝑈𝑈�𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖?̅?𝑍𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=0 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗Δ?̅?𝑍𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,   (1) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the unemployment rate for for country i at time t, 𝑈𝑈�𝑡𝑡 and ?̅?𝑍𝑡𝑡 are the cross section 
averages of the unemployment rate and the measures of insiders’ power respectively, with 
𝑈𝑈�𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 and ?̅?𝑍𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1. Therefore, as suggested by Pesaran et al. 
(2013), the CIPSM test is based on the average of the individual cross-sectionally augmented 
ADF t-ratios for 𝜙𝜙𝚤𝚤�  (𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖) as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇) ,   (2) 
while, the CSBM test is based on the average of the cross-sectionally augmented Sargan-
Bhargava statistics, given by: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇) ,   (3) 
with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑇𝑇−2 ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 /𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖2, and where 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=1 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖2 = ∑𝛵𝛵𝜏𝜏=1 ε�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 /[𝑇𝑇 − (𝑘𝑘 +1)] and 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑡 are the residuals from the regression of Equation (1). 
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Simulated critical values of both tests are listed in Pesaran et al. (2013). Both tests reject the null 
hypothesis of hysteresis in unemployment (i.e., the unit root null hypothesis) when the value of 
the statistic is less than the respective critical value. According to Pesaran et al. (2013), neither 
test shows any size distortions for combinations of N and T, whilst the CSBM test exhibits higher 
power compared to the CIPSM test for smaller T. 
Our testing framework, thus, uses an augmented Dickey-Fuller panel regression with the 
inclusion of alternative measures of labour market (and possible combinations of them) as 
additional covariates to testing for unit root in the unemployment rate. In this way, a rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in unemployment rate will lead to the 
conclusion that hysteresis in unemployment is absorbed by the labour market covariates, and 
thus it can be explained by the insider-outsider theory. Therefore, the information contained in 
the proxies of the insider-outsider theory affects the power of the unit root test, indicating that 
the unemployment rate in OECD countries does not display hysteretic behaviour. 
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results based on the alternative panel unit root tests for the 
unemployment rate without and with covariates, both in the case of an intercept and that of an 
intercept and a linear trend.4 Specifically, Table 3 presents the results of the tests without the 
covariates: the MW, CH, IPS tests and the CIPS test that accounts also for cross-sectional 
correlation. All tests, clearly, do not allow us to reject the null of a unit root in the unemployment 
rate at the 5% level of significance, indicating that unemployment exhibits pronounced hysteretic 
behaviour for the panel of OECD countries.5  
 
                                                          
4 Following Pesaran et al. (2013), we use the lag augmentation order for the panel tests according to p = [4(T/100)1/4]. 
5 This evidence is also confirmed by the individual ADF unit root tests for each country. These results 
show that for all countries we cannot reject the null of a unit root (with the exception of the version with 
trend where the results hold for the vast majority of the countries (i.e., 16 out of 17 countries)). This is a 
strong evidence of hysteresis for the OECD sample. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests (without Covariates) Un. Rate Without Trend  With Trend  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  28.770 -0.319 -1.612 -2.005  30.349 0.306 -2.133 -2.523 Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. The lag order is selected according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the covariate panel unit root tests of Pesaran et al. (2013), CIPSM 
and CSBM, that allow us to control for the addition of the insider-outsider covariates (Union, 
Coord and Wbl). To explore the robustness of these tests to the choice of the additional 
covariates used in the ADF panel augmentation in Equation (1), we report the results of both 
CIPSM and CSBM tests using all possible combinations of the covariates (Union, Coord and 
Wbl), as well as using the first principal component of the three covariates (Power). In contrast to 
the previous outcome of the tests without covariates, the evidence based on the CIPSM covariate 
panel unit root test shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel is strongly rejected at 
the 5% (in 10 out of 16 cases) or 10% level (in 3 cases) for all possible covariates and for most 
of the alternative combinations of them. The only exceptions are in the case of using Coord as 
the additional covariate where the CIPSM test does not reject the null in both versions with and 
without trend, and the case where the two covariates (Coord and Wbl) are used in the version 
without trend, where the null cannot be rejected at the conventional levels of significance. The 
results based on the CSBM test are similar and reveal stronger evidence of rejection of the null 
hypothesis of hysteresis for all sixteen cases of choices of covariates.6 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Our results are robust to alternative sets of OECD countries. For example, we have explored the set of 
the 15 OECD countries used in Mitchell (1993) and Song and Wu (1998) with qualitatively similar 
findings. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests (with Covariates) Un. Rate   CIPSM  CSBM  Covariates  Without Trend  With Trend  Union  -2.824** 0.143**  -2.927** 0.080**  Coord  -2.117 0.125**  -2.598 0.098*  Wbl  -2.561** 0.137**  -2.667* 0.082**  Power  -2.620** 0.140**  -2.733** 0.087**          Union & Coord  -2.678** 0.144**  -3.020** 0.079**  Union & Wbl  -2.716** 0.135**  -2.948** 0.073**  Coord & Wbl  -2.545** 0.121**  -2.555 0.084*          Union & Coord & Wbl  -2.477* 0.153**  -2.778* 0.074* Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. The critical values for the CIPSM test, in the case of one additional covariate, are -2.32 and -2.21 with an intercept only and -2.73 and -2.63 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  In addition, the critical values for the CSBM test, in the case of one additional covariate, are 0.238 and 0.264 with an intercept only and 0.097 and 0.104 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The critical values for the CIPSM test (with two additional covariate) with an intercept only are -2.43 and -2.31 and with an interept and a linear trend are -2.80 and -2.68 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  The critical values for the CSBM test (with two additional covariate) with an intercept only are 0.207 and 0.231 and with an interept and a linear trend are 0.084 and 0.090 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The critical values for the CIPSM test (with three additional covariate) with an intercept only are -2.49 and -2.37 and with an interept and a linear trend are -2.81 and -2.69 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  The critical values for the CSBM test (with three additional covariate) with an intercept only are 0.178 and 0.200 and with an interept and a linear trend are 0.072 and 0.078 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The lag order is selected according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that while we find a strong evidence of hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment for the OECD countries when we use the panel tests without covariates, this 
result is completely reversed when we use the panel tests that allow for the insider-outsider 
covariates. The inclusion of the proxies makes the unemployment rate stationary, leading to the 
conclusion that the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment can be explained by the insider-
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outsider theory. Insiders’ power, thus, determines the level of unemployment persistence through 
labour market rigidities and turnover costs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the widespread use of insider-outsider theory to describe the hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment, little is known empirically about its validity as a cause of this behaviour. Using 
three proxies of insider-outsider power, this paper investigates empirically the relationship 
between insider-outsider theory and unemployment hysteresis. To do so, we employ covariate 
panel unit root tests on a sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1960-2013. Our initial 
findings provide evidence of hysteretic behaviour of unemployment for our sample. However, 
we find that the insider-outsider theory, proxied by the trade union density, the coordination of 
wage-setting and the level of wage-bargaining, can absorb the persistence of unemployment rate 
in OECD countries. 
Our findings suggest that reforms towards lower labour market rigidities, such as lessening the 
power of insiders through limiting the role of trade union and/or reducing the wage-bargaining 
level, can lead to lower unemployment persistence. 
This study focuses on the insider-outsider theory, however, future research can investigate 
empirically other potential sources of unemployment hysteresis suggested by the literature, such 
as intensity of job search, demoralisation, and employment protection. Finally, we have used 
three proxies of labour market rigidities associated with insiders’ power due to data limitation, 
however, future studies can also test other factors that affects labour market rigidities such as 
labour turnover cost and employment protection. 
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